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Remarks:

*2136*  
Executive Secretary

*12/4/81*  
Date

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## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

December 3, 1981

SECRETMEMORANDUM FOR MR. JAMES W. NANCE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: NSDD on CBW Arms Control

Attached for consideration by the President is a draft National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) for United States CBW arms control policy. The draft NSDD was reviewed by a Senior Interdepartmental Group on October 5, subsequently amended, and has now been approved by the Interagency Group on CBW Arms Control.

L. Paul Bremer, III  
Executive Secretary

## Attachment:

Draft NSDD of December 2, 1981,  
on CBW Arms Control Policy

cc: OVP - Ms. Nancy Bearg Dyke  
OSD - Col. John Stanford  
JCS - LTC Edward Bucknell  
CIA - Mr. Thomas B. Cormack  
NSC - Mr. Allen Lenz  
OMB - Mr. William Schneider  
ACDA - Mr. Robert Grey

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NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DIRECTIVE NUMBER \_\_\_\_\_

UNITED STATES CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS  
ARMS CONTROL POLICY

I have reviewed the interagency recommendations on United States chemical and biological weapons arms control policy and approve the policies set forth below.

To encourage compliance with the 1975 Biological Weapons Convention and the Geneva Protocol of 1925, the United States will:

(1) Intensify its public information campaign and use the 36th United Nations General Assembly debate, particularly the UN Group of Experts investigating CW use and debate in the First (Political) Committee on the issue of reports of chemical and toxin weapons use in Afghanistan, Laos and Kampuchea, as well as discussions in the Committee on Disarmament and other international fora to continue to expose the chemical and biological warfare activities of the Soviet Union and its associated states to international scrutiny and pressure;

(2) Seek to convene\* a meeting of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention with the aim of strengthening its verification and compliance mechanisms in light of probable Soviet non-compliance, and to provide an additional forum for

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\*The phrase "Seek to convene" represents the policy decision which is required, and is used without prejudice to tactical judgments (i.e., whether the US would propose the meeting or support the Swedish proposal for a meeting of States Parties) to be made once policy approval is obtained.

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maintaining international pressure on the Soviet Union concerning its chemical and biological warfare activities; and

(3) After assessing the results of the steps above, and after evaluating interagency analyses, consider invoking the other two remedies provided by the Biological Weapons Convention:

- (a) taking the issue to the United Nations Security Council, and
- (b) as an ultimate step, withdrawing from the Biological Weapons Convention.

To provide the basis for proceeding with the above, the Government is directed to study and submit recommendations on:

- specific measures to strengthen the verification and compliance provisions of the Biological Weapons Convention;
- the relationship of the United States' position on biological warfare to other arms control, East-West and United Nations strategies;
- consultations with United States allies on a strategy in the United Nations and elsewhere; and
- the legal issues associated with formally charging the Soviet Union with violation of the Biological Weapons Convention.

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With respect to chemical weapons arms control, the United States will:

(1) Support the eventual objective of concluding a complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons production, development and stockpiling, recognizing that for the foreseeable future such a prohibition would be unverifiable by national technical means alone;

(2) Ensure that chemical weapons modernization proceeds so that the United States has a credible and effective deterrent retaliatory capability and so that the United States can gain negotiating leverage in the area of chemical weapons arms control;

(3) Allow the United States-Soviet negotiations to lapse informally; and

(4) Support chemical weapons arms control discussions in the Committee on Disarmament leading to multilateral negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament on a chemical weapons prohibition, if further interagency study should support such a step.

In support of United States chemical weapons arms control objectives, the Government is directed to study and, by January 30, 1982, submit recommendations on United States Government positions with respect to:

- verification;
- declarations of chemical warfare agent and munitions stocks and production facilities;

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- entry into force;
- an appropriate public posture with respect to CW arms control;
- relationship of the United States' position on chemical weapons to other arms control, East-West and United Nations strategies; and
- consultations with the United States allies on a strategy in the United Nations and elsewhere.

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